Constitutional Law -- Bar Admissions -- New Standards for Inquiry into Applicants\u27 Associations and Beliefs by Rapp, David M.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 50 | Number 2 Article 6
2-1-1972
Constitutional Law -- Bar Admissions -- New
Standards for Inquiry into Applicants' Associations
and Beliefs
David M. Rapp
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David M. Rapp, Constitutional Law -- Bar Admissions -- New Standards for Inquiry into Applicants' Associations and Beliefs, 50 N.C. L.
Rev. 360 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol50/iss2/6
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
financially irresponsible motorists may escape liability for their negli-
gence, the Supreme Court may have unwittingly added new momentum
to the drive for wholesale reform of our automobile accident compensa-
tion system.
THOMAS A. LEMLY
Constitutional Law-Bar Admissions-New Standards for Inquiry into
Applicants' Associations and Beliefst
Bar associations have long conducted inquiries into the associations
and beliefs of applicants and excluded those "subversives" likely to be
a threat to the judicial system. I Since the first amendment applies to the
states 2 and protects the rights of belief and association, constitutional
problems arise when the state attempts to probe into this area. In Febru-
ary 1971 the United States Supreme Court decided three cases dealing
with the power of state bar associations to compel answers to questions
about the political associations of bar applicants. In Baird v. State Bar3
and In re Stolar4 questions posed by the Arizona 5 and Ohio6 bars were
held to be overly broad because they touched upon innocent as well as
tThe potential effects of the primary cases used here were analyzed while appeals to the
Supreme Court were pending in Note, Attorneys-Admission to the Bar-Consideration of the
Constitutionality of Bar Examiners' Inquiries into Political Associations and Beliefs, 48 N.C.L.
REv. 932 (1970). Having come before the highest court, they now deserve further consideration.
'Remarks of Hon. Samuel J. Kanner, Chairman of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, in
54 THE BRIEF 153, 154-55 (1959).
2E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
3401 U.S. 1 (1971).
'401 U.S. 23 (1971).
'Question 25 of the Arizona examination asks: "List all organizations, associations and club
[sic] (other than bar associations) of which you are or have been a member since attaining the age
of sixteen years." Question 27 asks: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party or any organization that advocates the overthrow of the United States by force
or violence?" ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN., S. CT. RuiE 28(c), Exhibit A (Supp. 1970-71). Mrs. Baird
answered Question 25 satisfactorily but refused to answer Question 27. 401 U.S. at 4-5.
'Stolar declined to answer the following questions:
12. State whether you have been or presently are. . .(g) a member of any organization
which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force ....
13. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of which you
are or have been a member. 7. List the names and address of all clubs, societies or
organizations of which you are or have become a member since registering as a law
student.
401 U.S. at 27.
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illegal membership in organizations. However, in a companion case,
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond 7 the
Court upheld questions 26.(a) and 26.(b) from the New York examina-
tion' because they focused on organizational membership which was
tantamount to criminal activity and therefore was a legitimate interest
of the state. Although the Court recognized the danger of such probes
it refused to forbid all questions dealing with political views and associa-
tions. The purpose of this note is to analyze the three cases, compare
them with the previous law, and evaluate the significance of the holdings.
A comparison of the powers of public employers and bar associa-
tions to inquire into the organizational membership of employees and
7401 U.S. 154 (1971). A three-judge United States District Court granted partial relief by
eliminating or revising certain questions objected to in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'The questions from the New York examination which are discussed in this note are:
26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any
organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or
association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United
States or any state or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or over-
turned by force, violence or any unlawful means? If your answer is in the affirmative,
state the facts below.
401 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
26.(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such
membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organiza-
tion or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States
or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence or any unlawful means?
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
LSCRRC also involved other issues which are outside the scope of this note. Petitioners
challenged New York's requirement that applicants possess "the character and general fitness
requisite for an attorney and counselor at law." The requirement was affirmed because New York
construed it "as encompassing no more than 'dishonorable conduct relevant to the legal profes-
sion.'" 401 U.S. at 159, quoting Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,
299 F. Supp. at 144 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Petitioners also urged that the requirement of third party affidavits attesting to good moral
character violated the right to privacy. The Court rejected this as bordering on the frivolous. 401
U.S. at 160.
In addition petitioners attacked the oath of "belief in the form of and loyalty to the Govern-
ment of the United States." 401 U.S. at 161. Although the Court recognized that on its face this
oath might be construed to violate the permissible scope of inquiry, it upheld the oath since as
construed by New York it merely required the applicant to swear that he will support the constitu-
tions of the United States and the state of New York. Id. See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403
U.S. 207 (1971).
Finally, petitioners challenged two questions which asked whether the applicant could take the
oath of support for the Constitution without mental reservation. The Court ruled that there could
be little doubt of their validity since they were simply supportive of the applicant's good faith while
taking the oath; in other words the oath is not pro forma. 401 U.S. at 165-66.
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applicants reveals close parallels. Public employers have for two decades
been prohibited from excluding from employment those employees who
had no knowledge of the illegal goals of organizations to which they
belonged A requirement that teachers list all organizations to which
they had belonged in the previous five years has been overturned as
having a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of association by
discouraging group membership.' 0 The present standards of constitu-
tional inquiry by public employers are set forth in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents1 and Elfbrandt v. Russell:2 any imposition of civil disabili-
ties on employees for membership in the Communist Party, even mem-
bership with a knowledge of the Party's goals, are now invalid without
a showing that the employee had the specific intent to further the illegal
goals of the party.' 3
Most of these standards had previously been extended to the bar
applicant in a process of gradual evolution. In 1945 the Supreme Court
upheld the refusal of a state bar to admit a conscientious objector be-
cause he could not truthfully take the oath of support for the state
constitution which required male citizens to serve in the militia in the
event of peril to the state. 4 Twelve years later the Court, in Konigsberg
v. State Bar (Konigsberg I) 5, held that without a showing that the
applicant had engaged in or supported unlawful activities he could not
be excluded from the bar, even though he may have been a member of
the Communist Party. A companion case further held that arrests with-
out convictions are not sufficient evidence of bad character to justify
denial of admission to the bar. However, in 1961 a second Konigsberg
v. State Bar (Konigsberg II)11 allowed the bar to exclude the applicant
for refusing to answer a question, although the answer to the question
could not be in itself a ground for exclusion. The Court felt that the
state's interest in ensuring that its lawyers are dedicated to the law and
'Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In question 26. (a) of the New York examination
this requirement of scienter is met.
10Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
11385 U.S. 589 (1967).
12384 U.S. 11 (1966).
13385 U.S. at 609-10; 384 U.S. at 19.
"In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
15353 U.S. 252 (1957).
"Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 243-46 (1957).
17366 U.S. 36 (1961). The examiners gave Konigsberg a hearing and advised him that refusal
to answer would lead to exclusion.
[Vol. 50
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orderly change outweighed the constitutional infringement occasioned
by disclosure of past organizational membership, even though the ques-
tion did not focus on knowing membership with specific intent. Thus,
Konigsberg was said to be merely obstructing the examination process
rather than exercising his first amendment rights. On another front, a
California court had held that a criminal conviction is not a ground for
summary exclusion; the conviction which leads to exclusion must be
relevant to the practice of law."8
The recent cases afforded the Court an opportunity to equalize the
standards for public employees and bar applicants. The petitioner in
Baird answered a question which required her to list all organizations
to which she had belonged but refused to answer a second question which
required her to state whether she had been a member of the Communist
Party or any other organization the goals of which were the violent
overthrow of the government. 9 Justice Black's plurality opinion20 em-
phasized that since there was no requirement of scienter the second
question forced her to guess at the goals of the organizations to which
she had belonged. 21 When an individual's first amendment rights are
threatened, the state must carry a heavy burden of proof in establishing
the necessity of its actions.3
The assertion that the state has an interest in the character and
competence of its lawyers was inadequate since Mrs. Baird had given
sufficient response to other questions to satisfy the state's need.s Fur-
thermore, the question she refused to answer was an inquiry into mere
beliefs, which are constitutionally immune to inquisitions designed to
exclude one from the bar. 24
Stolar dealt with the rejection of a member of the New York Bar
'"Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1966). The court also said that a belief that a lawyer has a duty to disobey some unconstitutional
laws is not an inference of bad character.
"See note 5 supra.
"Baird and Stolar were both 5-4 decisions with the fifth vote in each case provided by Justice
Stewart's separate concurrence. Therefore there was not a majority Court's opinion in either case.
21401 U.S. at 5.
"Id. at 6-7.
2ld. at 7. Mrs. Baird listed former employers and law professors and also the following
organizations to which she had belonged: church choir, Girl Scouts, Girls Athletic Association,
Young Republicans, Young Democrats, Stanford Law Association, and Law School Civil Rights
Research Council. Id. at 7 n.7.2 1d. at 8. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
19721
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who had applied to the Ohio Bar. Stolar made available to the examiners
extensive background information 2 and orally stated that he had never
been a member of the Communist Party or the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society. He then refused to list all the organizations to which he
had belonged and to state whether he had been a member of an organiza-
tion which had plotted the overthrow of the government. The Court held
that the applicant cannot be excluded for beliefs alone, even if he person-
ally entertains beliefs the effectuation of which would be criminally
punishable conduct .2 The required listing of organizations may lead to
an intimidating further investigation and have a chilling effect on the
potential applicant's activities, thus infringing on the freedom of asso-
ciation.2Y As in Baird, Justice Black felt that Stolar had given ample
information for the bar to determine his fitness and therefore was not
required to answer a question which delved into a protected area. 21
Justice Stewart's concurring opinions in Baird and Stolar are par-
ticularly significant since his was the deciding vote in each case.20 Al-
though Justice Black's opinions stressed the concept that when the appli-
cant has furnished sufficient background information the bar has no
need or right to inquire into his political beliefs, Justice Stewart's votes
were cast because the questions might have led to exclusion for member-
ship without knowledge of the group's illegal goals and without the
specific intent to further them.30
In LSCRRC Justice Stewart wrote for a majority composed of
himself and the four dissenters in Baird and Stolar.31 LSCRR C involved
a group of law students who had not applied for bar admission but
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against two questions on the
25401 U.S. at 29. Stolar made available to the Ohio Bar the following information which had
been furnished to the New York Bar: his law school; every address at which he ever lived; names,
addresses, and occupations of his parents; his elementary and high schools; names of nine former
employers; his criminal record (two speeding tickets); nine character references; and extensive
background about his previous activities such as Boy Scouts, Moot Court, and religious activities.
21Id. at 28-29.
DId. at 28.
2Md. at 29.
"'Justice Stewart's opinions are, in effect, the law. The "lowest common denominator" concept
calculates the law as the common ground shared by the plurality opinion and any concurring
opinions that are necessary to give a majority.
11401 U.S. at 9-10; 401 U.S. at 31.
3'Justice Stewart's views in Baird and Stolar are expanded in LSCRRC. Justices Harlan,
White, and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger dissented in Baird and Stolar relying primarily on
Konigsberg I. 366 U.S. 36 (1961) and the idea that the bar should be protected from those who
would use the bar to upset the judicial system and society. 401 U.S. at 11; 401 U.S. at 31.
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New York examination which inquired into the organizational member-
ship of applicants.12 The first question required the applicant to affirm
or deny his participation in any group which he knew advocated the
overthrow of the government by force, violence, or any other means. The
second question, only to be answered if the first question drew an affirm-
ative response, inquired into the individual's specific intent to pursue the
admitted goals. Stewart's views were essentially unchanged from Baird
and Stolar, but here he detected an adherence to constitutionally accept-
able guidelines not present in those two cases." Since the state has the
right to protect itself from the very real danger of subversive attorneys,
it may ask questions of applicants which specifically identify those who
pose the danger. Questions which are preliminary to further investiga-
tion are permissible as long as exclusion would result only when the
investigation revealed that the applicant had actively engaged in subver-
sive activity.m There is no requirement that each question reflect these
standards, but rather the examination process as a whole must operate
within these limits. Since the inquiry stops for those who answer the first
question in the negative, there will be no unwarranted further interroga-
tion; therefore there will be no needless intimidation leading to a chilling
effect on the activities of law students.35 In a nutshell, the state may
exclude for knowledgeable membership and specific intent to further
illegal goals because this protects a legitimate state interest without
unnecessarily infringing on the applicant's first amendment rights.
Although the plurality's view in Baird and Stolar that if the appli-
cant has furnished sufficient information no further inquiry is allowable
is not treated in LSCRRC, one must conclude that it is not the control-
ling guideline when the three cases are viewed together. Justice Stewart
does not raise this issue in either of his concurring opinions, dwelling
instead on knowing membership and specific intent. Since his position
is the obvious polestar for lower courts, the sufficient-information stan-
dard will probably not play a prominent role in future decision-making.
The petitioner in Konigsberg 1136 had also furnished other background
information while steadfastly refusing to answer the questions posed by
the committee. The Konigsberg II holding on this point has been af-
"See note 8 supra.
"401 U.S. at 165-66.
uld.
3Id. at 154-59, 166 n.19.
-366 U.S. 36 (1961). See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
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firmed; the examining committee, not the applicant, will determine the
direction of the inquiry, subject to constitutional guidelines.
Baird, Stolar, and LSCRRC have, however, limited the Konigsberg
II standards of constitutionally permissible inquiry by bar examiners.
The Elfbrandt and Keyishian standards of scienter coupled with specific
intent have been applied to inquiries by the bar, extending the same
rights to bar applicants that have been enjoyed by public employees.3"
Not only must these requirements be met before the applicant may be
excluded, but also, in contrast to Konigsberg II, the applicant may
refuse to answer without being barred for obstructing the examining
process if the standards are not met.3 Furthermore, since membership
in an organization with knowledge of its illegal goals and with the spe-
cific intent to further those goals is criminally punishable, 31 the new
standards will exclude applicants only when their associations are tanta-
mount to criminal conduct.
The various objections to political inquiry need to be carefully ana-
lyzed. One objection raised against all inquiry into organizational mem-
bership was that a chilling effect inevitably results from such inquiry.4
That is, since law students realize that they may be held accountable for
their associations, they will be inclined to avoid any potentially damag-
ing associations. This objection is not easily thrust aside. When an appli-
cant gives a positive answer to New York's question 26.(a) and a nega-
tive answer to question 26.(b) he has exposed himself to further investi-
gation when, in fact, there may be no constitutional grounds for exclu-
sion. This particular instance may discourage group membership by law
students without serving the state's interest since the state has no legiti-
mate interest in the protected activities of applicants. This slight danger
is outweighed by the recognized interest of the state in determining the
qualifications of its lawyers." Furthermore, the new standards make it
clear to law students that they cannot be excluded for associations which
are not criminal in nature, and they can plan their activities accordingly.
Finally, membership which is reflected by a positive answer to both
26.(a) and 26.(b) is criminal conduct under Scales v. United States" and
deserves no protection from any chilling effect.
3See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
'sSee 401 U.S. at 7; 401 U.S. at 30-31.
"'Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1961).
11401 U.S. at 167.
"Id. at 165-66.
42367 U.S. 203 (1961); see text accompanying note 39 supra.
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It has also been argued that inquiry into group membership aids in
the perpetuation of a homogeneous bar by excluding "subversives" at
a time when there is a great need for lawyers who are sympathetic to
minority views. 3 The most obvious reply to this objection is simply to
ask if the modern bar appears to be homogeneous. The answer has to
be "no." With the narrower ground for exclusion indicated by Baird,
Stolar, and LSCRRC, an even less homogeneous bar may be anticipated
in the future. Mere political beliefs are protected-it is the participation
in an illegal activity which may result in denial of admission.44
Another argument relied on in LSCRRC is that when suitable
alternative methods are available there is no legitimate state interest
served by inquiry into organizational membership and therefore the first
amendment rights of applicants must tip the scales of justice.4 5 Alterna-
tives such as the criminal process, contempt powers, and disbarment are
sufficient to deal with the conduct of lawyers. Justice Stewart admitted
in LSCRRC that while this may be "wise" New York had made its
decision to conduct another program which is also within permissible
limits.46 It is quite possible that the declaratory nature of the case
aroused little sympathy with the Court since petitioners could not show
that anyone had ever been unconstitutionally excluded under the pro-
gram.47 Furthermore, would the alternative methods urged in LSCRRC
be sufficient to protect the bar? Certainly recent history shows that the
alternatives are less than foolproof.48 It may be very unwise to force bar
associations to rely as best they can on post-admission sanctions. Justice
Black argued in dissent in LSCRRC that excluding a man from his
career is as much of a punishment as depriving him of his property and
therefore should require the same level of culpability. He felt that since
3Comment, Bar Admissions-The Character Investigation as an Unconstitutional Scheme to
Promote Conformity: Comment on LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 23 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1969). Justice
Black raises this issue in dissent in LSCRRC. 401 U.S. at 181.
"Positive answers to the New York questions will not inevitably lead to exclusion but rather
to further investigation where the applicant has a chance to explain the' circumstances of his
membership. 401 U.S. at 165-66.
4401 U.S. at 167.
"I1d.
4
"1d. at 165.
4 For an evaluation of the present practices and recommendations for the future, see American
College of Trial Lawyers Report and Recommendations on Disruption of the Judicial Process, 16
CATHOLIC LAW. 242, 249-53 (1970).
11401 U.S. at 174.
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under Brandenburg v. Ohio5 an individual can be punished only when
his speech raises an imminent danger of incitement to lawless conduct,
the same standard ought to be met before an individual is excluded from
the practice of law.5 Brandenburg is distinguishable, however, because
it involved a more pure form of speech while the sanctions under
LSCRRC are directed at specifically illegal activity. The bar associa-
tions only attempt to regulate the profession, not to impose punishment.
Denial of admission to the bar for subversive activities is no more a
penal sanction than denial of admission to a convicted felon would be
double jeopardy.
Other writers have pointed out that not all jurisdictions inquire into
the activities of bar applicants.52 In England an applicant must have
certificates of good moral character from two United Kingdom residents
who have known him for one year.5 He is ineligible for admission if he
is an undischarged bankrupt or has been convicted of an offense that the
examiners deem relevant to the profession. Canada's Ontario Province
abolished character investigations after finding no relationship between
prior conduct and conduct subsequent to admission." Apparently not
even all United States jurisdictions inquire into the loyalty of bar appli-
cants beyond the oath of support for the Constitution." Perhaps these
are enlightened jurisdictions, but as Justice Stewart noted, while other
programs may possess desirable features, the state has the right to con-
duct its own program within established guidelines. 5
Baird, Stolar, and LSCRRC represent a step forward by the Court
because they assure applicants that only activity which could result in
criminal punishment is a ground for denial of admission to the bar.
50395 U.S. 444 (1969).
5401 U.S. at 183-84.
'PComment, 23 VAND. L. REV., supra note 43, at 145-46.
Old. at 146 n.97.
uRemarks by Richard J. Roberts at the Joint Session of the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar and National Conference of Bar Examiners in The Canadian Approach to
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, 36 B. EXAMINER 6, 34 (1967).
"Brown & Fasset, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953).
See also 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 7(b), 12 (1937). It has not always been thought that
character examination was necessary. Under chapter five of the NORTH CAROLINA REVISAL OF 1905
an applicant who demonstrated his competence in the law was entitled to be licensed. Ch. 963, § 3,
[1818] N.C. Sess. L. 1436. The North Carolina Supreme Court read this statute as a prohibition
against investigations into moral character. In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 31, 32-36 (1906).
Did the threat of Communism contribute to the increasing scope of examination? See introductory
paragraphs in Baird, 401 U.S. at 2-3; and Stolar, 401 U.S. at 24-25.
.'401 U.S. at 167.
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There are arguments against any character examination by the bar, as
ihere always are when constitutional rights are limited. However, it is
well established that the states may, within limits, ask questions to
ascertain the moral fitness of applicants before admitting them to the
bar. The state has no right to unlimited inquiry and the applicant has
no right to expect to be free from all inquiry. By prohibiting exclusion
when there is no showing that an applicant has been a member of an
organization with knowledge of its illegal goals and has entertained the
specific intent to further those goals, the Court has extended the rights
enjoyed by public employees to bar applicants.
DAVID M. RAPP
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and the "Right" to Housing
In 1950 California voters adopted article XXXIV of the state con-
stitution with the express purpose of bringing decisions of public housing
authorities which involved the construction of "low rent housing" under
the state's mandatory referendum procedure.' Some twenty years later
the Supreme Court of the United States, in James v. Valtierra,2 upheld
the constitutionality of article XXXIV against the charge that it denied
equal protection of the law to persons who though eligible for low-rent
housing lived in areas in which the referendums were defeated. More
specifically, James raised the issue of whether the requirement of a
referendum to construct "low rent housing" placed an unduly heavy
burden upon low-income persons by singling them out from other classes
of citizens eligible for public housing.
The case was first heard on the district level by a three-judge panel
'"No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any
manner by any state public body until" approved by the majority of the voters in the local electorate
where it is to be developed, constructed, or acquired. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
Article XXXIV was a response to the creation of housing authorities in each city and county
in California. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34240, 34327 (West 1967). These local bodies were
given the power to borrow money and accept grants from the federal government through the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1430 (1970). When the citizen-initiative
referendum procedure of article IV, § I of the state constitution was held inapplicable to decisions
of the local housing authorities in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d
457 (1950), the stage was set for the passage of article XXXIV six months later.
2402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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